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When Civil Rights Go Wrong: Agenda and
Process in Civil Rights Reform
by CHARLES F. ABERNATHY*
A full generation has come of age in the twenty-five years since the
assassination of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in the spring of
1968.' Dr. King's trusted lieutenants in the field,2 contemporary giants
who toiled in parallel rows,3 and even his rivals of a similar age,4 have
virtually all passed from the civil rights scene. A set of leaders and advo-
cates deemed young at Dr. King's death has itself grown older and wiser
from twenty-five years astride the stage of the civil rights movement.5 It
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; A.B., J.D., LL.M., Harvard
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for the last two years and who have, in the process, become colleagues rather than assistants.
As a professor, the author also thanks the members of the Civil Rights Policy Seminar (Fall
Semester, 1992), whose openness and candor challenged him to write this article. Renee Alex-
ander (discrimination in mortgage lending), Andrea Bernard (critical race theory), Raymond
Di Camillo (homosexual marriages), Scott Hulsey (family Issues), and Kelly Rausch (AIDS
and the FDA), in particular, wrote papers that taxed the author's ideas and provided sources
that fueled his work. Although these people aided him immeasurably, the author avows that
any mistakes in this work are his alone, and the responsibility for ideas expressed here, which
at times are diametrically opposed to those of his students, rests with him alone.
The author was a junior co-founder of the Southern Poverty Law Center in 1970, where
(with Joseph Levin, Jr.) he wrote the briefs for civil rights plaintiffs in, among other cases,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 566
(1974); and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). He is also the author of CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LMGATION (1992), THE LAW OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY (1990) (with Stephen N. Shulman), and CIVIL RIGHTS (1979). The author lec-
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This article is an expanded version of the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. lecture delivered at
Temple University School of Law on March 22, 1993.
1. Earl Caldwell, Martin Luther King is Slain in Memphis; Guard is Called Out, Curfew is
Ordered in Memphis but Fires and Looting Erupt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1968, at 1; DAVID
LEVERING LEWIS, KING: A BIOGRAPHY 389 (2d ed. 1978).
2. See RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, AND THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN 253
(1989) (discussing King's confinement in Birmingham jail).
3. Linda Greenhouse, Thurgood Marshall, Civil Rights Hero, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1993, at Al; Juan Williams, Puzzling Legacy of 1954; Historic Decision's Effect De-
bated, WASH. POST, May 17, 1979, at Al.
4. Peter Kihss, Malcolm X is Shot to Death at Rally Here; Three Other Negroes
Wounded-One is Held in Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1965, at 1; Elijah Muhammad Dead;
Black Muslim Leader, 77, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1975, at 1.
5. Lynne Duke, Civil Rights Activist Ben Chavis Selected to Head NAACP- Cleveland Min-
ister Wins Vote Over 2 Others, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1993, at Al; Jean Merl and Stephanie
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is time for change.
The aging of the persons leading the civil rights movement is only a
metaphor for a more serious aging process that afflicts the movement. It
is a sclerotic condition that has kept an old agenda and once-prodding-
but now increasingly intolerant-ideas in place, a fixed way of thinking
that has become more strident and resistant to change as it has become
more complacent with itself. Once the opponent of conformity, some
parts of the civil rights community now preach conformity within their
communities.6 I see these not as indices of the venality of the civil rights
movement, but as human responses that can be reformed by the contri-
butions of a new generation. This change has already begun to occur,
and my goal is to have a new generation build an immunity to sclerosis
into the movement, an immunity that avoids the hardening of its agenda
by remembering that civil rights is a process, not simply an agenda.
In the first part of this article, I want to break with the tradition that
requires that only good things be said about the civil rights movement. I
seek to identify some serious shortcomings that have a consistent theme:
the sclerotic tendency of some civil rights communities to see civil rights
as a static agenda rather than as a process. More emphasis on process, as
at least of equal value with the agenda itself, will open the civil rights
movement to change and reinvigoration. In the second part of this arti-
cle, I focus on some fundamental intellectual conceptions of the civil
rights movement in order to suggest some possibilities for how a reinvig-
orated movement might reconceive "civil rights." I suggest, in particu-
lar, that the very success of the original civil rights movement has led to
too much imitation and insufficient conceptualization of alternative mod-
els for describing and solving social issues in the civil rights field. Creat-
ing new arguments and concepts, I suggest finally, is not enough, for they
must be tested in a new way: not by asking only if they promote the civil
rights agenda, but by asking if they constitute fair process.
I. INTRODUCTION: PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS A CONTEXT FOR
REFORM
By virtually any measure, the original civil rights movement, the
Chavez, Jackson Calls for Unity after Trial, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at 3; SCLC Takes Up
Battle Against Guns, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 6, 1993, at A18.
6. I do not attempt a comprehensive definition of the term "civil rights community" be-
cause none is necessary for the thesis of this article. Any minority community sufficiently
cohesive to define its membership in part by reference to a trait or characteristic that also
prompts others to deny dignity to that community, e.g. African-Americans or Mexican-Ameri-
cans, is a civil rights community. This working definition poses some irony for my thesis,
however, for part of my contention is that civil rights communities at times over-define them-
selves and their members, demanding too much conformity and assuming that members of the
community define themselves only in terms of their community.
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movement for liberation and equality for "colored people," "Negroes,"
"blacks," or "African-Americans" has been enormously successful.
Measured by the goals set in 1947, virtually the entire legislative agenda
of the post-World War II movement7 has been enacted into federal law.
We now have civil rights laws that prohibit racial discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations;' that prohibit racial discrimination by programs re-
ceiving federal financial assistance;9 that prohibit racial discrimination by
all employers,' governmental as well as private;" I that prohibit racial
discrimination in both government-owned and privately owned hous-
ing; 2 and that prohibit governmental machinations having the purpose
or effect of limiting the voting power of Americans because of their
race.'3 Initially adopted in the remarkably short period between 1964
and 1968, and based in no small measure on the moral persuasiveness of
Dr. King and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference,' 4 these
statutes revolutionized racial relations in the United States. Measured
against its own legislative agenda, the African-American liberation
movement has been perhaps the most successful social movement in
American history.
The enactment of these statutes has not yielded a mere paper suc-
7. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 107-12, 151-
73 (1947) (recommending federal protection of civil rights through article I powers over vot-
ing, defense, interstate commerce, taxing and spending, postal system, District of Columbia
and territories). Congress has legislative power originating outside article I as well. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (empowering Congress to abolish slavery by legislation); id. amend
XIV, § 5 (empowering Congress to enforce fourteenth amendment by legislation); id. amend.
XV, § 2 (empowering Congress to enforce voting rights by legislation); cf Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 100 (1945) (upholding constitutionality of criminal statute prohibiting
wilful violation of fourteenth amendment). The Supreme Court, however, had viewed these
powers as limited to enforcing the judicially defined terms of the Civil War amendments. See
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-22, 32 (1883) (fourteenth amendment does not authorize
direct congressional regulation of private rights, but only correction of prohibited state action);
cf Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169, 173-74 (1970) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)
requires same degree of state action as required for fourteenth amendment violation). Use of
article I power to prohibit racial discrimination, therefore, would free Congress to develop its
own definition of civil rights.
8. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1988).
9. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d-7 (1988); cf Title IX
of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1988); The Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
10. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1972). To a certain extent Congress itself remains beyond the
reach of the law. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, 1077
(1991); but see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
12. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1988).
13. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988); Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
14. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS 883-85 (1988). See also LEWIS, supra
note 1, at 119, 230.
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cess. Although the practical successes since 1968 have been less than
what the legal successes of 1964-68 might have led us to expect, 5 they
have nevertheless been almost everything that Alex Haley's grandmother
Queen 6 might have wished for. There are now over 7,500 elected offi-
cials of African-American ancestry.17 African-Americans now comprise
approximately seven percent of all J.D. students in law schools, a rise
from less than four percent in 1971.18 Entry into other professions has
also pressed ahead: when I recently needed surgery, for example, my sur-
geon, radiologist, and anesthesiologist were African-Americans, assisted
by two white nurses. Some parallel civil rights movements, such as those
seeking to aid women or disabled persons, for example, may claim paral-
lel success.19
Among those of us who celebrate the life of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., I suspect that there is a consensus that more remains to be
done. That leads me to my topic for today, for my view is that part of
the more that needs to be done is to reform and reinvigorate the civil
rights movement itself. Although I have spoken so far of the African-
American civil rights movement, I now speak more broadly of the civil
rights community in general.
I believe that the failings of the civil rights movement fall into three
broad categories: prejudice that is deep-seated and irrational; intolerance
that is perhaps rational and purposeful, but nevertheless deeply destruc-
tive of the open society that makes social remedies possible for current
and future civil rights communities; and the intrusion of base politics and
the dissembling of lobbyists that devalues the moral persuasiveness of the
civil rights community. What all three failings have in common is a sin-
gle-minded pursuit of the civil rights agenda, which ignores the more
fundamentally, and more enduringly, valuable view of civil rights as a
process. After making these criticisms, I want to suggest some causes for
15. Recent studies have demonstrated that poverty rates differ among the races. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Neuffer, Racism Seen as Battle in Poverty War, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 1992, at 1;
Spencer Rich, Poverty Found to Grow Fastest Among Whites; Population: They Make Up the
Largest Bloc of Poor, Although Proportionately They Lag Behind Blacks and Latinos, Study
Shows, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at A24; Frank Swoboda, Forty-five Percent of Black Children
In U.S. Poor, Study Says, WASH. POST, Oct 2, 1989, at A4.
16. ALEX HALEY & DAVID STEVENS, QUEEN (1993).
17. Peter Applebome, Enduring Symbols of the Confederacy Divide the South Anew, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at A16 (discussing whether Georgia's state flag is racist symbol in cur-
rent political climate).
18. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REVIEW
OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FALL 1992 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-31; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1991). See also Tony
Munroe, Women Minorities Lead Growth in the Nation's Workforce in 1980s, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1993, at Cl.
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these failings, and I want to challenge a new generation to break free of
my generation's failures and chart a new course for civil rights.
II. CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL WRONGS: A CRITIQUE OF SOME
PRACTICES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMUNITY
Let me begin with the most spirited statement of my criticism. Prej-
udice and intolerance infect not only foes of the civil rights community
but members of the civil rights movement itself. We stereotype others;
we are prejudiced against those deemed outsiders or foes; and, most of
all, we have become intolerant of those who think differently from the
prescribed "civil rights" viewpoint. In short, the norms we espouse seem
often to be only for others-we exempt ourselves.
A. Prejudice
EPITHETS. It has become increasingly socially unacceptable to issue
racial or ethnic epithets or to make anti-gay remarks in public, and so
such remarks usually occur at closed meetings,"0 in hushed conversa-
tions,2' or only among those known to be receptive. 22 It is a dark secret
of the civil rights movement that racial and ethnic epithets flow like
water in discussions among members of traditional civil rights communi-
ties. Only occasionally does knowledge of these epithets become public,
as when the press reported during the 1984 presidential primaries that
the Reverend Jesse Jackson had referred to New York City as
"Hymietown." 23 While the scope of the problem is difficult to document
because of the privacy of the settings in which it occurs, anecdotal evi-
dence abounds. 24 Given the intra-group friction that has sometimes
20. Peter Baker and Kent Jenkins, Jr., Fairfax GOP Dinner Featured Black, Gay Jokes,
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1993, at Al.
21. See Georgetown University, Gay Student Groups Settle Bias Lawsuit Blocking Bond
Issue, THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 30, 1988, at 25. Negotiators for the university, in the author's
experience, encountered council members of the District of Columbia who in public referred to
"gays" but in private disparagingly called the same persons "queers." Cf John F. Harris,
Wilder Says the Joke Wasn't His, WASH. POST, May 11, 1993 at B 1 ("Some gay rights activists
said today that Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder's lisping, limp-wristed impersonation of
a homosexual last week ['in a crowded convention hall in front of several reporters'] showed he
is insensitive, while some Republicans said it showed he is a hypocrite."); Richard Harwood,
The Way They Lisp, WASH. POST, May 18, 1993, at A21 (revealing that Wilder's impersona-
tion of homosexual stereotype was done before small group of friendly reporters).
22. See, e.g., James Sterngold, Navy Plans Murder Charge in Death of Gay Sailor, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at A16; 3 Marines are Acquitted of Assault at Gay Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 1993, at B8; 2 Marines Disciplined in Fight with Gay Patrons of D.C. Bar, WASH. POST,
July 5, 1990, at C7.
23. Fay S. Joyce, Jackson Denies Using Term Offensive to Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
1984, at A10.
24. Much of my anecdotal evidence comes from faculty members and students active in
the civil rights field. They report to me such references as the following: African-American
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arisen between some civil rights communities, 25 one does not need to
strain to hear the epithets.
Such epithets flow in the civil rights community for the same rea-
sons that they issue in other communities. First, civil rights speakers
sometimes consider that they are in the presence of a cohort group who
will understand and tolerate the remarks. Columnist Richard Cohen has
revealed, for example, that Rev. Jackson's remarks were made in the
presence of African-American reporters whom Rev. Jackson felt he
could trust.26 The epithet also works to control, belittle, or dehumanize
an opponent. When a magazine that characterizes itself as a fighter for
civil rights systematically publishes cartoons that picture Arabs as fanat-
ics or Muslims as cruel enforcers of moral law, 27 it accentuates and per-
petuates a regime that reduces Arabs and Muslims to mere caricatures.28
These cartoons are as deeply offensive to Arab-Americans 29 as similar
depictions are to African-Americans.3"
That some civil rights communities can have members prejudiced
against other traditionally disfavored groups is perhaps unremarkable. A
more fashionable and insidious trend is toward creation and populariza-
tion of derisive ethnic or racial stereotyping of non-victim ethnic groups
formerly considered to be in power. During the 1992 presidential prima-
ries, for example, experts at the prestigious Urban Institute regularly re-
ferred in public to the "Bubba vote,"31 that is, those white, largely rural,
civil rights activists on the District of Columbia Council who refer to homosexual rights advo-
cates as "queers"; an activist professor who referred to his Arab taxi driver as a "camel
driver"; a civil rights activist's sexual harassment of office workers that included regular refer-
ences to women as "c-ts."
25. The conflict that has occasionally arisen between the male-dominated traditional
black civil rights community and women's groups has often received public attention. Mau-
reen Dowd, The Thomas Nomination; Taboo Issues of Sex and Race Explode in Glare of Hear-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at 1; Ann O'Hanlon, Grass Roots and Glass Ceilings; Women
Carry Civil Rights Groups but Aren't Allowed to Lead, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1993, at C5
(discussing the recent NAACP elections). Professor Derrick Bell has also written about these
issues in a way that reveals the same struggle. Derrick Bell, The Effects of Affirmative Action
on Male-Female Relationships Among African-Americans, 21 SEX ROLES 13 (1989).
26. Richard Cohen, Deeds, Not Words, WASH. POST MAG., Mar. 21, 1993, at W5.
27. See PLAYBOY MAGAZINE, Oct. 1992 at 99 (Arab sheik in cartoon, enjoying bedroom
scene with four women, says "Can I call you back, Abdul? I'm on a roll.); id. at 169 (employee
drying hands on a towel roll reads sign announcing that "In Saudi Arabia if you use more than
four feet of towel, they cut your hand oil'"). Compare id. at 40 (magazine's editorial support
for purported women's equality).
28. See JACK SHAHEEN, THE TV ARAB 45 (1984) (describing television's caricature of
Arab women as veiled or one of multiple wives).
29. ARAB-AMERICAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, 1991 REPORT ON ANTI-
ARAB HATE CRIMES: POLITICAL HATE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS 9
(1992).
30. Debbi Wilgoren, D.C to Pay Fire Captain Over Cartoon; Officer Protested Ban on
Drawing, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1993, at B5.
31. One could, of course, make the argument that deriding "Bubba" was not a derision of
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southern voters who were presumed to represent a fairly monolithic bloc
of unsophisticated citizens.32 Moreover, the civil rights movement has
not merely used epithets created by others; it has also become adept at
creating new epithets. "Male chauvinist" and "homophobe" come to
mind as names that have the purpose and effect of dehumanizing oppo-
nents and excluding such persons from further discourse.33
BLOC-VOTING. Bloc-voting has long been a feature of American
politics useful in suppressing black voting power.34 More recently there
has emerged a countervailing prejudice, as bloc-voting activity by mem-
bers of civil rights communities has also emerged or has been en-
couraged. I do not include here such activity as voting in one's own self-
interest; if one party or candidate opposes the interests of civil rights
communities and the other does not, there is no prejudice, no irrational
judgment, in the civil rights community's overwhelming or bloc vote in
its own self-interest.
Yet we have begun to see in the last few years some consistent ap-
peals for bloc-voting that are little more than outright appeals to voters
in a civil rights community to vote for a particular candidate for no other
reason than a shared race,35 gender,36 or other group identity.37 Few in
all whites, but only an ignorant few; but it would be like arguing that making fun of pregnant
women is not a classification of all women, but only a sub-group of women. The civil rights
community has rejected that argument in the past. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974).
32. The speakers from the Urban Institute thus perpetuated a stereotype also pressed by
others who can at least claim less knowledge of equal treatment. See Ron Sessions, Toyota
TIGO: Beefy Enough for Bubba?, ROAD & TRACK, Mar. 16, 1993 (Special Series), at 106 ("As
an office-bound city slicker, I must confess to a somewhat stereotypical mental image.... It
involves cowboys wearing denim jeans, lots of beef on the menu, Hank Williams crooning over
a scratchy A.M. radio, and ... a long, bumpy ride in a pick-up truck.").
33. In books on child-raising, authors regularly remind parents to refer to specific behav-
ior as good or bad, rather than to refer to the child as good or bad. Such mild epithets as
"homophobe" not only play on the self-consciousness of the listener, they also play on the fear
of other listeners who dread being called homophobes themselves.
34. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (white voter's association implemented a
three-step exclusion process to suppress black voting power); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) (election judges refused to give an African-American a ballot to vote); Nixon v. Con-
don, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (Texas statute used to prevent an African-American from voting in a
primary election); White Primary Cases, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (African-
American prevented from voting in a primary). See also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973) (Texas legislature redistricting plan suppressed black voting power).
35. Dirk Johnson, Challenge at Home for Adept Player of Racial Politics, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1990, at 22 (discussing then-Representative Gus Savage, an African-American elected
from the second congressional district of Illinois, an African-American section of Chicago).
36. Joel M. Gora, Emily's List Showed What Democracy Can Do, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1993, at A16 (Emily's List is a political action committee that raised money for several women
candidates in the 1992 election).
37. Bettina Boxall, L.A. 's New Gay Muscle; With Big Bucks and Connections, The Local
Gay Community is Changing Politics Nationwide, L.A. TIMEs MAG., Mar. 28, 1993, at 27;
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the civil rights community have stood up to these appeals. 38 I realize
that one might argue that racial or gender identification is sufficiently
important to constitute the sole determinant of voter choice, but in my
view this argument either depends upon what is itself a stereotyped view
of persons of one race or gender,39 or achieves a result that few, if any,
rational voters would in fact desire.' To virtually all Americans, a can-
didate is more than his or her race or gender. To paraphrase Dr. King, a
candidate must be judged by the content of her character, not the color
of her skin or her gender identity. Or if I may quote a former student:
"I'm so disappointed," she told me a year after the jubilation of electing a
person of her race governor of a southern state, "because he's against my
position on virtually every issue except race."41
Bloc-voting is in essence the most curious form of stereotyping, one
in which a group member stereotypes his or her own group. Mary Mc-
Grory, the liberal editorialist for the Washington Post, exemplified this
self-destructive practice in a recent commentary on the unfortunate
events surrounding the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas. Following
the fire that destroyed the group's compound, she wrote the following:
"Janet Reno is getting kudos for taking it on the chin about her disas-
trous decision on Waco.... But she has let down people who thought
that with a woman calling the shots, calamities like [this] would not hap-
pen."42 Perhaps Ms. McGrory believes, along with the Justices who de-
Charles W. Hall, Gay Arlington Candidate Seeks to Set Mark in Area; National Group Backing
Board Race by Fisette, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1993, at A41.
38. Michael Abramowitz, Race Issue Moves Into Open as D.C. Campaign Heats Up,
WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1990, at Al. In 1991 a white politician, long a leader in the civil rights
community, ran for mayor of the District of Columbia, where the vast majority of registered
voters are African-Americans. In response to a whispering campaign against this candidate in
the black community, Roger Wilkens spoke forcefully to remind voters that to part with their
vote in 1990 for skin color alone was a further postponement of Dr. King's 1963 dream that
racism would die in America.
39. For example, one might vote only for women or African-Americans on the ground
that only such a person-and each such person-would be sympathetic to women or African-
Americans. Those are clear stereotypes.
40. One might argue that any female candidate is better than any male candidate because
there need to be more women in Congress in order to raise public awareness of the importance
of women's contributions to society. Few voters could actually believe this. It is very unlikely
that the election of porno star La Cicciolina ("little corpulent one") to the Italian legislature
contributed anything to the respect accorded women in Italian society.
41. See, e.g., Peter Baker and John F. Harris, Va. School Cuts Hit Suburbs Hard: Aid to
Many Districts Slashed 12%, WASH. PosT, Dec. 29, 1990, at AI (In order to reduce the state
deficit, Virginia's African-American governor, Douglas Wilder, slashed state spending on
schools).
42. Mary McGrory, Misjudgment and Tender Mercies, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 1993, at
[Vol. 2:177
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cided Bradwell v. State,43 in the "natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex." 44
TRIALS AND PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS. The civil rights community fi-
nally shows its prejudice in the way that it responds to "singular" public
events such as the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings in Washing-
ton in 1991, 4 1 the Rodney King trials in Los Angeles in 1992 and 1993,"
or the Harold Ford trial in Tennessee in 1993. 47 I allude here not to the
actual guilt or innocence of any party in these cases, but to a more funda-
mental issue-the instantaneously certain judgment reached within some
civil rights communities about who was lying, who was guilty or inno-
cent, in these singular confrontations. As I myself watched the Thomas
hearings among colleagues deeply devoted to civil rights, I was surprised
to hear derisive laughter in response to every statement by the nominee;
he was known to be guilty before being heard.48 In the Rodney King
case, there was a widely shared feeling that abuse had occurred.49 Yet
even before a federal verdict was read,5° trusted liberal columnist Lou
Cannon ventured into print with the media's "dirty little secret" that the
famous videotape was not clearly favorable to Mr. King and that the oral
testimony at trial presented an incident much more ambiguous than that
widely credited in the civil rights community.51 The jury's split verdict
appears to confirm Mr. Cannon's view, although some civil rights lead-
ers, as expected, denounced the jury's split verdict as "half justice."52
43. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (upholding the Illinois State Bar's refusal to admit
women).
44. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J. concurring). I do not argue that sex is never relevant. See
infra text accompanying notes 176-78. But in light of our experience with such leaders as
Golda Meir and Margaret Thatcher, it seems a stereotype to argue that women leaders are
opposed, as a group, to the use of force.
45. Juan Williams, Open Season on Clarence Thomas, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1991, at
A27.
46. Jay Mathews, LA. Beating Case Creates Odd Alliances" Noted Feminist Backs Chief
Gates; Gun Owners' Group Supports Foes, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1991, at A3.
47. Michael Isikoff, Lobbying by Rep. Ford, Black Caucus Preceded U.S. Reversal on
Trial Jury, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1993, at A4 (in his trial for bank fraud, Ford, an African-
American Congressman, argued for a new jury on the grounds that he would not receive a fair
trial with an all-white jury).
48. Several members of Georgetown's faculty represented Professor Anita Hill during her
testimony before the Senate and declared their belief in her account based upon their personal
knowledge of Professor Hill's integrity. Such prompt support for one side of a public dispute
lies outside the scope of my criticism because these persons had an independent, non-reflexive
basis for making a prompt determination of whom to believe.
49. Geoffrey Taylor Gibbs, LA. Cops, Taped in the Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1991, at
A23; Dorothy Gilliam, Just Remember, Rodney King is Not on Trial, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,
1993, at Bl.
50. Lou Cannon, Jury Convicts 2 Los Angeles Officers in King Beating; 2 Others Acquitted
in Civil Rights Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1993, at AI.
51. Lou Cannon, Not an Open-and-Shut Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1993, at C7.
52. Lynne Duke, Jury Convicts 2 Los Angeles Police Officers in King Beating; At 'Ground
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This prejudgment before the evidence is heard is prejudice by the
most ancient of analyses. Those of us who work in the civil rights field
are widely aware that police officers abuse African-American suspects,
especially African-American males apprehended in automobiles."
Those of us involved in the civil rights movement are also aware that
women often suffer the indignity of sexual harassment and remain not
only quiet about the episode, but publicly respectful of their tormentor
for years after the incident has occurred.' Since these incidents occur to
many black men and to many women, we jump to the conclusion that
every person charged with such conduct is guilty. In short, we reason
from the general to the specific; we prejudge based on our stereotypes
before we even hear the evidence.
Civil rights organizations are in an admittedly difficult situation in
some of these cases, for no one can expect an advocacy group to sit on
the sidelines during a hearing when advocacy is appropriate and neces-
sary. Nevertheless, in my opinion, civil rights groups have shown little
concern for two factors they should hold important. First, as is illus-
trated by the Harold Ford trial in Tennessee, civil rights leaders may
perpetuate the very racist or sexist stereotypes that they fight against.
Congressman Ford, an African-American, charged that he would be
treated unfairly by the almost-all-white jury scheduled to try him. Two
days later that jury acquitted him." Who acted based on racial stereo-
types, the jurors or Congressman Ford?56 Second, the tendency to treat
all such singular events as "show trials" demeans the individuality and
personhood of each participant in the trial. Individual guilt or innocence
is lost in the need to show that a larger public problem exists. This sacri-
fice of individual justice to the greater good is the very essence of the
denial of human rights.
B. Intolerance
DEMONSTRATIONS, OLD AND NEW. In the beginning, the civil
Zero,' Signs of Peace, Relief, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1993, at Al (paraphrasing Benjamin F.
Chavis, NAACP Executive Director).
53. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, BEYOND
THE RODNEY KING STORY: NAACP REPORT ON POLICE CONDUCT AND COMMUNITY RE-
LATIONS (1993).
54. Catherine Corcoran, Sexual Harassment Has Many Definitions, IRISH TIMES, Mar.
18, 1993, at 12.
55. See Don Phillips, Rep. Ford Acquitted of Fraud; Jury Verdict Ends Justice Dept. Case
Against Tennessean, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1993, at Al.
56. Although it was not widely reported, the Ford case broke other stereotypes: the judge
who transferred Rep. Ford's prosecution to a division with a high concentration of whites was
himself black. John Branston, Jury in Rep. Ford's Retrial Must Define What Is a Loan or
Bribe, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1993, at A20.
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rights movement took the position that demonstrations and other public
pronouncements promoted the essential public good of forcing society to
confront the results of its belief systems and its actions.57 Whether it was
African-American students marching on a courthouse demanding jus-
tice,5" marching in the streets demanding equal accommodations,59 "sit-
ting in" at a library to portray by their actions that African-Americans
could and would read,' ° or conducting boycotts and parades to break the
economic power of white-owned stores,6 the civil rights community
forced opponents to see that there was a dissonance between the equality
that those opponents preached and the inequality that they practiced.
When such confrontational tactics were legal, civil rights demonstrators
paid the price of confrontation by facing down angry counter-demonstra-
tors.6 2 When the confrontations were illegal, demonstrators paid the
price by going to jail.63
This right to demonstrate has customarily been accorded across the
board to all who would demonstrate non violently, for "the free speech
principle is grounded as much in a desire to avoid being the slaves of our
own intolerant impulses as it is in a desire to preserve an unshackled
freedom to speak one's own mind as one wishes." 6' Yet self-interest
always plays a role: the issue not decided by the Supreme Court in the
Skokie Controversy case, whether a bond so high as to prevent demon-
strations by Nazis could be demanded by local government, and not
raised when black activists held the "largest civil rights demonstrations
65in the South since the 1960s" in Forsyth County, Georgia, was later
57. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school regu-
lation prohibiting the wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War violates First
Amendment right to free speech); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Alabama
libel law declared unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds).
58. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (conviction reversed).
59. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (peaceful expression of unpopular views
may not be punished).
60. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). When refused service, the African-
American patrons "sat and stood in the room, quietly, as monuments of protest against the
segregation of the library." Id at 139. In reversing the convictions, the Court noted that
speech rights "are not confined to verbal expression." Id at 142.
61. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 900 n.28 (1982) (speech by
boycott leader threatening to "have their [African-American] necks broken" if African-Ameri-
cans violated boycott is protected by First Amendment).
62. See supra notes 59-61.
63. See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (convictions punishable by three months
in jail and $100 fine upheld because demonstrators who blocked passages at a jail were not
acting in a public forum ); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II) (conviction for
marching on a courthouse, which carried sentence of one year in jail and $5,000 fine, upheld
on basis of narrowly drawn statute).
64. Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and Free Speech
Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617, 629 (1982).
65. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2399 (1992) (large civil
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decided when demonstrators opposing the recognition of Martin Luther
King's birthday were silenced by a $100 parade-bond requirement.66 By
overturning the bond law, the Court preserved the rights of the Nazis in
Skokie, traditional black civil rights activists, and the Nationalists who
opposed national recognition of Dr. Martin Luther King's birthday.
Yet today, it is quite fashionable among some civil rights groups to
deny the speech interests of those who oppose them and their agenda.
Pro-choice activists have litigated,67 and now lobby,68 to outlaw demon-
strations at abortion clinics. Punishment of speech directed at persons
from civil rights communities topped some university agendas in the
1980s,69 and enhanced punishment for hate-motivated crimes remains an
issue this year.70  There may be lovely arguments to distinguish anti-
abortion demonstrations, or even the other cited restrictions, 7I from
traditional civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s, but they are not easy
arguments. 72
rights demonstrations prompted county to enact bond ordinances later enforced against Na-
tionalist Movement demonstrators).
66. Compare Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. 2395 with Smith v. Colin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978),
denying stay of 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
67. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (abortion clinic
protestors cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), former Klu Klux Klan Act).
68. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
69. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (ordinance targeted at hate speech is
unconstitutional under First Amendment).
70. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153 (1992) (statute providing heightened punish-
ment for hate crime is unconstitutional), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992).
71. The issue of enhanced punishment was anticipated by Justice Holmes over seventy
years ago in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919), a case
involving a 20-year sentence for obstructing war efforts: "the most nominal punishment seems
to me all that possibly could be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to suffer not for
what the indictment alleges but for the creed they avow .... "
72. Perhaps one could argue that the abortion clinics are different because they are pri-
vate, but the target of many civil rights demonstrations was also private facilities or homes.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (demonstration at mayor's private residence
lawful). Perhaps one could argue that the abortion demonstrations are violent or obstructive,
but the civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s through 1990s were also sometimes obstructive
and violent-and effective because of it. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 553-57 (1965)
("There is no doubt from the record in this case that this far sidewalk was obstructed," but free
speech may not be curtailed by a statute that allows possible punishment because of an admin-
istrator's disagreement with views expressed by demonstrators); Felicity Barringer, Hire City
Poor in the Suburbs, Report Urges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at D18; Patrick Lee, Banks
Band Together to Aid Riot Zone; Financing: Consortium Creates a Community Development
Corporation to Lend and Invest in Areas Where Others Fear to Tread, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31.
1992, at DI; R.W. Dick, Bush May Finally Achieve Enterprise Zone Legislation, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., June 5, 1992, at A10. Perhaps one could argue that the anti-abortion activists are
interfering with a constitutionally protected privacy interest, choosing an abortion, but civil
rights demonstrators who lay down in front of homes, see Gregory, 394 U.S. 111, or churches,
see Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (narrowing a district court injunction to
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I fear that it is more likely that some civil rights groups react so
vociferously against abortion activists for the same reason that some per-
sons opposed civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s-that is, opposition
to the demonstrators' views and to their effectiveness. I do not say that
vociferousness and even zealousness in response to anti-abortion activists
are violative of speech rights; they are indeed exercises of speech rights.
But seeking to have the demonstrators silenced by law is intolerant of
speech interests. Only recently have some district courts moved to mod-
ify their injunctions against anti-abortion demonstrators in order to re-
spect their speech rights."3
Although I am loath to cite a cliche, I rely here on one that has
passed into the philosophical mainstream: "Do unto others as you would
have them do unto you." An anti-demonstration penalty that disables
only one's opponents and not oneself is intolerant.
SPEECH THAT EXCITES AND OFFENDS. It was once a mainstay of
the civil rights movement that words that excite and offend, even racist
or physically challenging words, are precisely the kinds of words to be
protected by the First Amendment. Even though they were directed at
specific listeners, the Supreme Court has protected such language as
"white son of a bitch, I'll kill you" '74 and "g-d d-n mother f-ker po-
lice."75 Symbolic speech such as burning the American flag has also been
protected in cases that began as protests against assaults on civil rights
leaders.76 Many cases that students read today as civil liberties cases
involving free speech were in fact originally civil rights cases involving
demands for African-American equality. In New York Times v. Sulli-
van,77 when Justice Brennan wrote that speech should be "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open," he was protecting the provocative words of civil
rights groups. And when Justice Holmes proposed the theory that every
idea is an incitement, he was protecting civil rights demonstrators of his
preserve civil rights group's demonstration calling on church to pay reparations), were in that
sense also violating fundamental rights to privacy, association or religion.
73. See Marianne Lavelle et al., Abortion Clinics, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993, at 23 (stating
that Judge Oberdorfer has appointed an amicus curiae to consider this issue in National Or-
ganization for Women v. Operation Rescue, CA89-2968-LFO).
74. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (speech protected, at least in the absence
of a narrowly drawn statute); cf Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (conviction for
Black Panther member's reference to African-American police officer as "black mother-f-
king pig" reversed and remanded in light of Gooding).
75. See Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (mother's reference to police arresting
her son), vacated, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 n.1 (1972) (holding "son of a bitch"
protected in the absence of a narrowly drawn statute).
76. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (reversal of conviction for burning flag
in protest over shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith).
77. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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day.7
8
Contrast that protection for aggressive dissenting speech to the pun-
ishment that some modem civil rights activists propose for "hate
speech," speech that, as in the recently invalidated St. Paul ordinance, is
usually defined in terms of speech hated by civil rights activists and hurt-
ful to civil rights communities. 79 At my own law school two years ago,
the leader of the Black Law Students' Association ("BLSA") filed a disci-
plinary complaint against a student who wrote a student newspaper arti-
cle deploring the use of what the writer saw as racial quotas. The BLSA
leader did not object because the article was maliciously or recklessly
false-or even because it was extremely poorly drafted and artlessly ar-
gued-but because she thought that its arguments hurt the feelings and
standing of African-American members of the community. 0 Mean-
while, a group of other students and minority staff members devoted
their energies to a principle more consistent with the history of the civil
rights movement-that the cure for uninformative and hate speech is
counterspeech, that sunlight is the best disinfectant.8 "
It was once true that one could always rely on the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") to defend freedom of speech for even the
most heinous and hateful of speech. Even into the last decade, the
ACLU defended demonstrations planned by the Nazis in Skokie, Illinois,
a town purposely targeted because the demonstrations would hurt and
offend the large number of Holocaust survivors who had emigrated
there.8 2 Now, as Nat Hentoff has so effectively revealed, the ACLU is
riven by a deep split in its ranks about speech that is harmful and offen-
78. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
for the protection of socialist demonstrators protesting Western intervention in Russia).
79. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
80. See complaint filed in response to Timothy Macguire, Admissions Apartheid, LAW
WEEKLY, Apr. 8, 1991, at 5, with Professor Peter P. Weidenbruch, Chair of the Committee on
Professional Responsibility, on file with Special Collection, Georgetown University Law
Center Library.
81. Saundra Torry, Affirmative Action a Flash Point at GU, Law Students Jam Meeting to
Decry Articles as Racist, WASH. Posr, Apr. 17, 1991, at D1; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 305 (1964) (quoting Justice Brandeis as saying "sunlight is the most powerful of all
disinfectants"). It is sometimes argued that hate speech is different because its hurtfulness is
directed at particular individuals, thus distinguishing it from the generalized protests against
social conditions in such cases as Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (peace symbol
attached to flag to protest Cambodian invasion and killings at Kent State). But constitutional
law, encouraged by the arguments of civil rights groups, is precisely to the contrary. The Nazi
marches in the Skokie case targeted particular individuals for offensive remarks because of
their ethnicity. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978). And in Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), involving a cartoonist's depiction
of the Rev. Jerry Falwell having sex with his mother, the Court protected vituperative remarks
directed at a single individual because of his religious convictions.
82. Myra MacPherson, The Nazis and Skokie; Notes From the Real Life Drama, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 17, 1981, at Bl.
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sive to African-Americans and women.83 It has created a position that it
calls a compromise,8 4 but the ACLU's position is one that is so result-
oriented that even non-lawyers see through its transparency.85 Should
compromise ultimately be necessary, that does not lessen the loss occa-
sioned when the ACLU itself does the compromising. A group that has
always been a process-oriented civil rights organization, one in which the
only agenda was the openness of the speech process, has now become just
another agenda-driven organization.
C. Political Norms and the Civil Rights Community
Having spoken about prejudice and intolerance in the civil rights
community, I now turn to the third of my criticisms-that the civil
rights community has begun to play politics by the rules of those it for-
merly opposed, that it exempts itself from the high standards for which it
once fought. Let me focus briefly on two sub-areas.
LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. In Feb-
ruary of 1993, African-American representatives in Congress arranged a
meeting with the Acting Attorney General to lobby for the disempanel-
ing of a predominantly white jury chosen to hear criminal charges
against one of their colleagues, Representative Harold Ford of Memphis,
Tennessee. 6 I realize that elected African-Americans serve in many ca-
pacities other than their elective ones because of the vast disempower-
ment of African-American communities. Yet, opposition to intervention
by politicians in the justice system is a longstanding and necessary part of
the civil rights community's ethic. 7 The actions of the Mississippi Sov-
ereignty Commission showed how politicians can use their power to sub-
vert individual justice, even as they argue that they are promoting a
broader social good. 8 This ethic has been so strong that as recently as
the 1960s, a violation of the ethic cost a sitting Supreme Court Justice the
opportunity for elevation to the position of Chief Justice.8 9
83. Nat Hentoff, 'Susceptible to Abuse; The ACLU's Civil War about 'Hate Speech'
Crimes, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1993, at A23.
84. Nadine Strossen, 'Hate Crimes. The ACL U's Position, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1993, at
AIg. "The position the ACLU's national board recently adopted instead said that society has
a right to treat discriminatory criminal acts more severely than other criminal exploits." Id.
(emphasis added).
85. Samuel Intrater, The ACLU and Bias Crimes, Letters to the Editor, WASH. POST,
Mar. 18, 1993, at A26.
86. Kenneth J. Cooper, GOP Alleges Impropriety in Ford Case; House Leaders Cite Lob-
bying Over Jury, WASH. PoST, Feb. 27, 1993, at A13.
87. R. ABERNATHY, supra note 2, at 163-68.
88. Jack Nelson, White Knights, Dark Hearts; The Hateful Summer When the Klan
Loosed Its Terrorists on Mississippi's Jews, L.A. TIMEs MAG., Jan. 10, 1993, at 28.
89. John P. MacKenzie, Fortas 'Proud' of Role as a Johnson Adviser: Senate Told of Aid
on Top Issues, WASH. POST, July 17, 1968, at Al. Although an association with a felon's
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It is perhaps lightly remembered today,9° but the very beginnings of
federal judicial reform of the criminal justice system can be found in the
African-American civil rights movement. The Court's landmark deci-
sion on the right to counsel, Powell v. Alabama,9 1 begins with these chil-
ling words: "The ... defendants are negroes charged with the crime of
rape, committed on the persons of two white girls." 92 No lawyer would
defend the "Scottsboro boys," 9a and they were each sentenced to death
following one-day trials.94 But one need not have a long memory or a
historian's understanding of the civil rights movement95 to know that the
protections of an independent judiciary and a certain law of criminal pro-
cedure-and indeed the very conception of procedural "rights"-inure
to the benefit of civil rights communities.96 As Judge Harry T. Edwards
noted in his dissent in United States v. Prandy-Binett,97 the evolving lax
standards for police searches, permitted in "the so-called 'War on
Drugs,' has produced a gross distortion of the case law in our criminal
jurisprudence" which will hurt primarily the "poor or people of color." 98
Political intervention into the judicial process in individual cases violates
a cardinal rule of the civil rights movement.
DISSEMBLING IN THE LOBBYING PROCESS. It is not only politicians
from the civil rights community who sometimes lapse into the practice of
playing politics like civil rights' opponents. It is not widely known
outside Washington, but one of the most effective and widely feared lob-
foundation was the immediate precipitating factor for Justice Fortas' resignation, LAURA
KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY, 370-78 (1990), the Justice's earlier, extremely close
advisory role to President Johnson had already sensitized the nation and the press to problems
of extra-judicial conduct. Id. at 357.
90. Modern criminal law casebooks in use for over the last decade do not even cite Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See, e.g., H. UVILLER, THE PROCESSES OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE: INVESTIGATION AND ADJUDICATION Xxxviii (1979) (table of cases).
91. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
92. Id. at 49.
93. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 17-18
(1969).
94. Powell, 287 U.S. at 50.
95. For a sampling of other cases in which civil rights communities played a role in devel-
oping procedural rights beneficial to all Americans, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) (recognizing group's ability to sponsor litigation by group members); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (limiting legislative investigations);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (limiting official inquiry into group's membership);
Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (allowing federal court to independently review state
court record for evidence in First Amendment case).
96. See, e.g., Kimberly Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1364 (1988); Patricia J.
Williams, Minority Critique of CLS: Alchemical Notes, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 405
(1987).
97. 995 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (view of a taped rectangular box carried by a minority
individual held to provide justification for police search of the box).
98. Id. at 1074-75 n.2.
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bying groups on Capitol Hill is the loosely affiliated civil rights lobby.99
With the adoption of the Family and Medical Leave Act," the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act, 01 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,02 it has
been remarkably effective. Indeed, the civil rights lobby has been more
effective at enacting legislation, which requires the extra energy of mov-
ing a body at rest into motion, than the number two lobbying organiza-
tion, the National Rifle Association, has been at defeating legislation.
Yet the tactics of the civil rights community in pressing for this leg-
islation have not been as noble as the legislation itself. When lobbying
for the Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example, civil rights lobbyists
painted a picture of a pressing need to overturn rapidly accumulating
conservative Court opinions.'0 3 Yet these lobbyists failed to reveal that
among those decisions slated for legislative reversal was one by Justice
Brennan that substantially advanced the cause of civil rights, though not
substantially enough to satisfy the lobbyists."° Another provision,
touted as codifying the existing law, would have permitted judicial re-
view of all factory closings or transfers, 0 5 a practice having no prece-
dent 0 6 in pre-existing Title VII jurisprudence. 0 7
Neither of these cases of lobbying involved lying, but they do raise
99. Steven A. Holmes, Washington at Work,; Lobbyist on Civil Rights Wins Despite Hostil-
ity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at A14 (describing Ralph Neas and the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights).
100. Pub. L. No. 103-03, 107 Stat. 6 (1993).
101. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1990).
102. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
103. Linda Greenhouse, Morality Play's Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at 26; Ari L.
Goldman, Urban League Leader Calls Equality Essential to U.S, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1991,
at A10.
104. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (holding the "mixed-
motive" defense to be a complete defense to liability, not merely a limitation on permissible
relief). Section 107(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overrode Justice Brennan's interpreta-
tion and mandated that the defense apply only to limit certain relief, leaving in place the
possibility of a declaratory judgment and attorneys' fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(B).
105. 137 Cong. Rec. H9,545 (1990) (discussing § 2104(o)(1)(b)).
106. Of course, any adverse employment action may be subject to scrutiny if it has an
adverse impact on employees' Title VII-protected class. See,. e.g., STEPHEN SHULMAN &
CHARLES ABERNATHY, THE LAW OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY $ 2.01-.03
(1990). Under Title VI, and related "spending power" statutes, there had been some dispa-
rate-impact litigation by 1989 concerning activities that looked analytically like plant closings,
e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (cancellation of hospitalization program), but in
general suits against closing of facilities on the grounds that minorities were adversely affected
had by 1989 ended in massive failure. See Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defend-
ing Health Care Discrimination - It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (1990).
There had been no substantial parallel litigation under Title VII challenging plant closings,
and thus the proposed civil rights amendments could not have codified any results. Indeed,
the most similar line of litigation had occurred under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 629(a) (1982), and involved so-called reductions-in-force, or mass discharges.
Those cases showed no pattern of judicial interest in reviewing operational closings, and many
expressed explicit reluctance to do so. See Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772
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the troubling question of whether civil rights lobbyists should employ the
tactics of dissembling and misrepresentation that we have for so long
decried in opponents. This is an especially serious ethical issue for civil
rights lobbyists because a great deal of their work involves education and
consensus building. As necessary as it is to do the dirty work of getting
laws passed, it is equally necessary to ensure that a reliable, standard-
setting consensus was actually reached. 108 The process of legislative en-
actment is not unimportant.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS AS PROCESS AS WELL AS AGENDA
A. Dignity and Process
I have come to the conclusion that the various problems I have iden-
tified share a common underpinning. Each betrays a single-minded pur-
suit of the civil rights agenda while ignoring the truth that civil rights is
also a process. The agenda of the civil rights movement reflects a value
strongly promoted by Rev. Dr. King: each person is worthy of dignity
and respect because they are human beings. The fight for human dignity
for African-Americans, women, or other ostracized or disadvantaged
members of our society is not conducted because only these persons de-
serve dignity and respect, but because every person deserves dignity and
respect as a human being-and those denied such dignity need to be ac-
corded equality of dignity. The pursuit of that remedial agenda should
not take place through a process inconsistent with Dr. King's injunction
to respect the dignity of each person.
To the extent that the modern civil rights movement has strayed
from Dr. King's teachings and has laid aside civil rights process for the
single-minded achievement of the civil rights agenda, it has been influ-
enced by certain regrettable tendencies in American society generally. 109
(10th Cir. 1988) (ADEA "not intended as a vehicle for judicial review of business decisions");
SHULMAN & ABERNATHY, supra, at 14.08.
107. At the Conference on Equal Employment Opportunity Law sponsored by Ge-
orgetown University Law Center in 1991, I raised this issue with a lobbyist for the Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and noted that this provision does not in fact codify
precedent. "Well, you've got us there," replied the lobbyist.
108. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 unfortunately seems to contain an overabundance of
false compromises. Is the Act retroactive? See Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d
225, 227 (7th Cir. 1992) (per Posner, J.: Congress "dumped the question (of retroactivity] into
the judiciary's lap without guidance."). Does the Act change the business necessity defense to
make it more difficult to justify neutral rules having an adverse impact? Does the Act overturn
precedent and make "subjective" or "bottom-line" hiring subject to disparate impact analysis?
See 137 CONG. REc. § 15473 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Dole, explaining his
version of the compromise): "The burden-of-proof issue that Wards Cove resolved in favor of
defendants is resolved by this Act in favor of plaintiffs. Wards Cove is thereby overruled. [O]n
all other issues this Act leaves existing law undisturbed."
109. I lay aside the observation that must certainly also be true, that as mere mortals, the
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I would like to identify two such tendencies because I think that they go
directly to my goal in this article, that of inviting a new generation to
reform and reinvigorate the civil rights movement.
B. Inhibitors to Change and Reform: Mimicry of Success
Paradoxically, the single greatest inhibitor of change within the civil
rights movement has been its initial success. This success has spawned
ceaseless imitation, as the original movement and more recent offshoots
mimic prior successful strategies or actions. In Hollywood, a successful
film spawns a sequel, and a successful sequel spawns further sequels. Un-
fortunately, the same has happened with the civil rights movement.
This imitation probably explains some of the prejudice and intoler-
ance within the civil rights movement. Early successes for civil rights
were possible in large measure because the opponents of civil rights were
so clearly wrong as measured by the value system of the vast majority of
Americans. Demonstrations and confrontation worked precisely because
they induced Americans to confront their own contradictory feelings and
led them to see opponents of civil rights as fundamentally heinous perpe-
trators of social injustice.' 1 Building on this element of success, civil
rights communities have come to a position where demonizing of oppo-
nents is a subconsciously necessary element of the push for change. Just
as demonizing the Japanese in World War II gave permission to preju-
dice,11"' this demonizing ritual in the civil rights movement also exacts a
toll. 12
Yet, while the mimicry that afflicts the movement may explain some
of the prejudicial dehumanizing that goes on, it also operates as an inhib-
itor to creative change within the movement.
members of civil rights communities are as capable as anyone of venal fears, prejudices, and
intolerances. I see no need to dwell on this issue because I hope that the civil rights commu-
nity is more disposed to checking these feelings when they have been brought to its attention.
110. See, e.g., Bill Richards, Gun-Toting Klansman Denies Bombing Black Birmingham
Church in 1958, WASH. PosT, Sept. 29, 1977, at A5; see BRANCH, supra note 14, at 144 (in
response to bus boycott, white women write letters to the editor supporting "decent treatment"
for their African-American maids), 893-98 (public response to Birmingham church bombings).
111. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding the detention of Japanese-
Americans in California during World War II was constitutional).
112. I have spoken earlier of the prejudice we see in the modern movement; now let me
ask you to consider other examples. The various branches of the civil rights movement build
their constituency in part by such demonizing of the opposition: to some gay rights activists,
for example, it is useful to picture opponents, who may act for religious or other traditional
reasons, not as persons to be persuaded but as "homophobes" to be vilified. See Richard
Harwood, Thought Police in America, WASH. POST, May 11, 1993, at A19 (dean at Washing-
ton College accused of being a "Nazi" because he objected, on financial grounds, to extension
of university employee benefits to all "domestic partners"). Such demonizing, perhaps effec-
tive, reduces the essential humanity of the opponents, and thus undermines the human-dignity
goal of the civil rights movement.
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THE EXCLUSIVENESS OF THE INTEGRATION MODEL. Dr. King's
Negro civil rights movement, as Professor Cook has demonstrated, was
built on a model of Christian love and sameness of all persons, beneath
the skin, that made it a compellingly persuasive case for equal treatment
and integration in a reconstructed community.'" 3 Whether from reac-
tion to the holocaust or from their own ethnic experience, many non-
African-Americans saw skin color as the only permanent difference be-
tween blacks and whites." 4 Once skin color was overcome as a barrier,
not only acceptance, but a genuine bonding and love could follow be-
cause "you are me, I am you" in all life's institutions and feelings. 15 In
short, while there might be cultural differences between African-Ameri-
cans and non-African-Americans, this view saw no difference in terms of
biology or individual dignity."I6 This "full equality," or mutuality model
of equality, found strong resonance in the American civil rights move-
ment of the 1960s.17
This model serves as an important ultimate goal for all equality
movements, but it also impedes practical thinking about other models.
The movement for women's equality has been stymied at certain stages in
part because it did not appear to be true to all concerned that "you are
me, I am you": women, after all, could bear children,"8 and even after
113. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1023-30, 1033-41 (1990).
114. The operative word here is "permanent," for there were in fact differences in socio-
economic terms, KERNER COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 123-31 (1968), and in African-Americans' perceptions of daily life
among theoretically enlightened whites, see Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The The-
matic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864,
1869 (1990); Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 436, 437
(1987).
115. In King's view different groups might bring distinctive experiences to life's table.
See Lewis V. Baldwin, Martin Luther King, Jr., the Black Church, and the Black Messianic
Vision, in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER, THEOLOGIAN, ORATOR 15
(D. Garrow ed. 1989) (distinctive black suffering); cf. Charles F. Abernathy, Affirmative Action
and the Rule of Bakke, 64 A.B.A.J. 1233, 1236 (1978) (expressing the hope that the Bakke
case would create a regime under which "race will be seen as a differentiating factor.., but
one which divides us no more than any other day-to-day distinction"). But these were only
different experiences, not differences in human potential or dignity.
116. This view may be best understood as the antithesis of a competing model, that of
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 357
(1896). The former case saw all African-Americans, slave and non-slave, as an inferior race,
and the latter, masquerading as a case about mere social differences, reaffirmed that view.
117. See BRANCH, supra note 14, at 44-46.
118. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 146 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This citation may seem reversed between majority and dissent, but it is not. It was Brennan
who argued that "pregnant persons" were inherently "women," and not just another undiffer-
entiated subset of all persons.
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that issue was finessed,"1 9 there followed an unsettling amount of other
research that showed that women are different from men in such funda-
mental ways, from how their muscles behave to whether both genders
respond in the same way to medical treatment. 120 As a practical matter,
this leaves the current women's rights movement with some degree of
division, as the question arises whether. pregnant women should be
treated exactly the same as similarly temporarily disabled men, or
whether it is acceptable to accord special benefits to pregnant women. 12 '
Some might see a similar situation arising with the gay rights movement,
where such trusted leaders as General Colin Powell have argued that
homosexuals are essentially different. Unlike Negroes in the 1940s, Gen-
eral Powell has argued, homosexuals cannot be integrated into the mili-
tary because, though blacks and whites are the same, homosexuals are
different because of their chosen course of conduct and lifestyle.122
Might a new generation develop a different model for explaining
equality-one that recognizes the sometimes socially constructed, but
sometimes inherent differences between different groups of persons in so-
ciety? Recognition of these differences need not debase the human dig-
nity of and respect due any person; the fallacy that there is no difference
would yield to a new argument that there are no meaningful differences
in terms of human dignity for each individual.'23
So far only advocates in the disability branch of the civil rights
movement have made overt and consistent use of this alternative model
for civil rights. While discussion in other equality movements continues
to focus on the old vocabulary about intentional and effects-style "dis-
crimination," the new Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) 124 and its forbearer, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,25
frankly admit that disabled persons are different from the norm'2 6 and
119. See The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(defining "sex" in Title VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination).
120. Study Indicates Angioplasty Riskier for Woman, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9,
1993, at 4A; What Doctors Don't Know about Women; NIH Tries to Close the Gender Gap in
Research, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1992, at Z10.
121. The intra-family debate came to a head in the litigation over the legality under Title
VII of special pregnancy benefits for women, an issue settled in California Fed. Say. & Loan
Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (the plurality opinion holding that Title VII extension to
pregnant women promotes equal employment opportunity).
122. A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind: General Powell and the Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1993, at A23.
123. See supra note 115.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101-12,213 (1990).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
126. The EEOC Guidelines for the ADA specifically refer to the concept of the "normal"
in defining who is disabled. See 29 CFR § 1630.2(h): "[H]eight, weight or muscle tone that are
within 'normal' and are not the result of a physiological disorder" are not disabilities. See
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deserve "reasonable accommodation."' 27 This could provoke a quarrel
among some about the socially constructed nature of what is "normal,"
but the ADA outflanks the argument: "Yes, disabled persons may be
different," it posits, "but that difference can at times be easily accommo-
dated so that the difference makes no difference." '28 In other words, the
public world should be reconstructed, with balanced consideration for
the cost to all,' 2 9 so that differences do not detract from the material and
spiritual worth, the human dignity, of each person. This model of "as-
sisted equality" also has strong roots in American charitable
traditions. 3 0
Liberation from the single traditional notion of equality might also
be helpful to a broad range of groups seeking less regulation from society
or more independence in pursuing interests previously declared socially
unacceptable, especially in areas involving privacy. The gay rights move-
ment has proceeded substantially on the argument that homosexual rela-
tionships are as "normal" as heterosexual ones, that is, they are
"natural" and thus equal to heterosexuality.' A different approach
generally Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans With Disabilities Act Definition of Disability, THE
LABOR LAWYER 11 (1991).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990) (ADA provision); School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (interpreting § 504 regulations to adopt "reasonable accommoda-
tion" test).
128. 136 CONG. REC. H4,583, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1990).
129. This concept is not an insignificant one, but neither is it an inconsistent one. Indeed,
any scheme that required others to pay for changes regardless of cost would place others at a
relative disadvantage, as well as draw away resources that might be legitimately claimed for
the satisfaction of other societal needs. Thus, the concept of reasonable accommodation takes
into account not only the dignity and need of the disabled person, but also the dignity and fair
interest of others. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Trustees, 908 F.2d 740, 750-51 (1 1th Cir.
1990) (lift-equipped bus service $15,000 cost to provide service deemed not an undue burden
given university's $1.2 million budget); Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152-
55 (4th Cir. 1991) (provision of "cued speech" program for deaf students at all local schools
rather than at chosen central site would be "substantial modification" in program that § 504
does not require; no dollar-figure discussed).
130. 1 suspect that this model is not very popular because of the currently fashionable
view that charity is patronizing, and so it may be if that is how the giver and recipient feel
about the sharing of community largess. But that view says more about the shortcomings of
the giver and recipient than about the model; certainly there is no reason why social sharing
must be an inherently disempowering relationship for the recipient. See Karl E. Meyer, Edito-
rial Notebook" 'Cults,'Deconstructed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at D:16; Kristin Eddy, Mor-
monism's Sisters Lean on Each Other; Relief Society Was Begun 150 Years Ago, WASH. POST,
Mar. 21, 1992, at G 1l.
131. See Lawrence A. Kurdek, Correlates of Relationship Satisfaction in Cohabiting Gay
and Lesbian Couples: Integration of Contextual, Investment, and Problem-Solving Models, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 910, 920 (1991) (such relationships founded on same interac-
tions as heterosexual relationships); Margaret S. Shneider, The Relationships of Cohabiting
Lesbian and Heterosexual Couples: A Comparison, 10 PSYCHOL. WOMENS Q. 234 (1986) (find-
ing differences but attributing problems of homosexual relationships to "external" factors such
as social pressure).
[Vol. 2:177
WHEN CIVIL RIGHTS GO WRONG
could view homosexuals as different, in the sense that homosexual unions
produce no natural-born children, but take the position that this "differ-
ence" is one totally within the realm of private choice and thus consti-
tutes a difference that makes no difference. This could lead to a third
model for attaining equal rights, a "tolerance model" that asks neither
for love nor even acceptance, but just equal respect in being left alone. 132
I note that this model also has deep roots in American society, especially
in two areas deemed private throughout most of our history-religious
beliefs and political views.1 33
I suggest these alternative models for equality with some trepida-
tion, primarily because the possibility of choice raises the possibility of
bad choices. Professor Lani Guinier, righteously irritated with lax en-
forcement of traditional "mutual equality" notions in voting, 134 has
taken the position that it may be time to recognize an independent "right
to representation" for minority groups that would guarantee not only
equal access to the vote but a guarantee of representation. 135 This would
extend not only to election of African-American candidates but also to at
least some enactment of the African-American legislators' agenda. 36
This approach, which Professor Guinier calls an "access-based model"
132. For an opposing viewpoint, see Rhonda Copelon, Losing the Negative Right of Pri-
vacy: Building Sexual and Reproductive Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 15, 46
(1991): "To settle for mere tolerance of sexual difference as opposed to social affirmation of
self-definition is not only degrading, but ultimately self-defeating." In my view, Copelon
misses the entire point of sexual privacy-that "social affirmation" is irrelevant, unwanted,
and itself a sign of a submissive relation with others who should have no control of private
choices. Copelon also shows no stopping point for her equality, thus missing all of the sub-
stantial occasions for line-drawing that Prof. Chamallas has recognized. See Martha Chamal-
las, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777
(1988) (discussing marriage-based, consent-based, and egalitarian-based models, the last of
which would justify state regulation of exploitative relationships even when they are "consen-
sual"). Just as one need only tolerate my religious or political choices to avoid offending me,
one need only tolerate my non-exploitative sexual choices.
133. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656-58 (1992) (affirming ban on sectarian
prayer in schools, noting that the "design of the Constitution is that preservation and transmis-
sion of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private
sphere, which is itself promised freedom to pursue that mission"; good-faith attempt to make
prayer acceptable to all is a "contradiction" of the principle of religious "toleran[ce]"); Young
v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (quoting Voltaire: "I disapprove of what
you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.").
134. Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV.
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 393, 399-414 (1989).
135. Id. at 426.
136. Id. at 427 (the right means "creating districts.., in which such a [black] representa-
tive can be elected"); "Second, equal status as participants within the political sphere is possi-
ble only if members of the group are allowed to participate at all stages of the process [and
thus] contemplates minority participation in post-election ... coalition-building and delibera-
tion." Id. at 428. Guinier is not altogether clear on the issue of whether the election of blacks
would naturally lead to part of the "black agenda" being adopted or whether a mechanism
would be necessary to achieve such a result. See id. at 424-25 & n. 138. See also Lani Guinier,
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for legitimacy or equality, 137 puts to the test one's conception of African-
Americans. Are such persons as a group fundamentally different,1 31 or
are African-Americans and non-African-Americans the same underneath
the skin, as the "mutuality" model posits?
Professor Guinier's approach suffers from three major problems.
First, she assumes that the only possible social context that can explain
African-American candidates' losses is one of racially polarized vot-
ing,' 39 hardly a credible assumption in light of our knowledge that Afri-
can-Americans are elected even in majority non-African-American
jurisdictions"4 and Guinier's own evidence showing that "black incum-
bents are in fact re-elected with more white support."'' Admitting that
the issue is contextual, her problem here is that her assumed context may
be either incorrect' 42 or too broad.143 A more fundamental second prob-
lem is whether the proposed cure reinforces the disease. If actual Afri-
can-American representation is necessary for African-Americans as a
group, and presumably necessary for others having a history of voting
victimization,"' it will become also appropriate for Guinier's "whites" to
consider themselves a cohesive group--and the problem of polarized vot-
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and Theory of Block Electorial Services, 89 Mich.
L. Rev. 1077, 1133-34, nn.275-83.
137. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1991).
138. Guinier appears to believe this, see Guinier, supra note 134, at 422 (multiple refer-
ences to blacks as "they" and group-wide attribution of what "they want"); "Black representa-
tive" is important to "black empowerment", and she offers statistical data to show that this
group conception may be held by Ninety-one percent of blacks. See id. at 422 nn. 128-29 (91%
of voters would prefer to be able to elect a black person rather than merely influence outcome
of election as swing voters).
139. Id. at 424 n.138 ("Because of extreme racial polarization within the electorate, the
pluralist model does not work for blacks.").
140. See, e.g., For the Record, WASH. POST, June 20, 1990, at A20 (discussing the elec-
tions of L. Douglas Wilder as governor of Virginia, David Dinkins as mayor of New York,
Norman Rice as mayor of Seattle, John Daniels, Jr. as mayor of New Haven, Connecticut, and
Cynthia Moore Chestnut as mayor of Gainesville, Florida); Paul Ruffins, California: Where
Black Politics Began, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1989, at M3 (discussing the elections of Tom Brad-
ley as mayor of Los Angeles and Mervyn M. Dymally as lieutenant governor of California).
141. Guinier, supra note 134, at 422 n.138.
142. See supra notes 140-41.
143. Assuming proof of prior discrimination, some affirmative response would be justified
under the "mutual equality" model, as explained in such voting rights cases as City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (interpreting section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965's
"effects test" as a remedy), and in school desegregation cases such as Green v. New Kent
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (integration, not required by the Constitution, is appro-
priate measure of whether segregation has ended in formerly segregated schools). Where there
has been no such showing, the remedial assumption would be too broad. Certainly we have no
reason to believe that racially polarized voting, sufficient to dilute minority voting strengt'i,
exists nationwide. See, e.g., Voinivich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1158 (1993) (unanimous
decision relying on finding of no such voting pattern in Ohio).
144. See, e.g., Salas v. Southwest Texas Jr. College Dist., 964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992)
[Vol. 2:177
WHEN CIVIL RIGHTS GO WRONG
ing will have become ingrained rather than eradicated. Every resort to
the "assisted equality" model runs some risk of reinforcing Dred-Scott-
like notions of inequality. 45 At times Guinier appears to espouse a
model of separation without inequality, but if that model is on her mind,
it is a model with a very poor modem track-record for peaceful accom-
modation of self-defined factions that live in a single jurisdiction."4
The search for alternative models that I propose, therefore, carries
with it a sobering obligation to make some very fundamental choices. On
racial matters, the most difficult and intractable in American life, Dr.
King's mutuality model for equality carries lasting appeal because it ex-
presses our most fundamental aspirations. While it is a formality with a
cost, 4 7 form may matter over function. 4 '
OVER-RELIANCE ON THE LITIGATION AND GOVERNMENT-RE-
SPONSIBILITY MODELS. The success of Dr. King's civil rights movement
has also focused civil rights activists on mimicking two other features of
that civil rights movement, the reliance on litigation as an enforcement
mechanism'49 and the related reliance on government efforts as the gen-
eral vehicle for ameliorating the ills affecting civil rights communities. 5o
Yet the success of both models might be as much the result of the acci-
("Hispanics" in southern Texas are such a group; because Hispanics are in majority, lack of
success for group not attributable to violation of Voting Rights Act).
145. Cf supra note 116.
146. John Pomfret, Croat-Muslim Battle Rages On in Bosnia;" Serb-Battered Town Found
Nearly Abandoned, WASH. PosT, May 11, 1993, at A12; David Hoffman, Many Israelis Say
Time Has Come to Cast Off Gaza, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 1993, at A21.
147. The loss of remedial action need not be a cost, as activists and centrists alike permit
remedial affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination. See City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (narrow affirmative action options; must be
remedial); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (broad options because remedial).
148. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, contains a so-called BFOQ
defense for such matters as sex or national-origin discrimination, but none for race. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e). Title VII also shows a similar concern for possible backsliding in Congress' deci-
sion to cover discrimination based on "color" as well as "race." See SHULMAN AND ABERNA-
THY, supra note 106, at 4.02[1][c]; cf United States v. Flagler County Sch. Dist., 457 F.2d
1402, 1403 (5th Cir. 1972) (faced with a claim that board did not know who was black, court
notes that same factors that made blacks identifiable for accomplishing segregation makes such
persons identifiable for accomplishing desegregation).
149. Every major "rights-creating" civil rights statute either has an explicit authorization
for suits, see, e.g., Yellow Freight System v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (both federal and
state jurisdiction over suits under Title VII), an "implied right of action," see, e.g., Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Title IX and, by implication, other Title-VI-based
analogues), or an action under the "and laws" language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see, e.g. Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (if other federal law creates
"rights" against state officer, it may be enforced through § 1983 unless other statutory remedy
is exclusive).
150. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 134, at 423-24 & n.138 (describing "Blacks' view of
political participation as a means of transforming and redistributing political and economic
goods").
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dents of history as their inherent preferability or workability. The litiga-
tion model grew up in large part because of the felicitous gift of a white
entrepreneur and the existence of a dedicated group of African-American
(and white) lawyers led by the late Justice Thurgood Marshall. 5 ' And
the government-responsibility model may have been only a by-product of
the success of the litigation model that relied on government: Dr. King's
social action model, from the days in Montgomery when Rosa Parks re-
fused to change her bus seat, 152 relied upon African-American self-
help," 3 African-American churches, 54 and the astute wielding of Afri-
can-American economic power. 55
This recognition suggests not that the government role in promoting
civil rights be abandoned, but that a new generation might well focus on
new models or the reinvigoration of models. In my view, many of the ills
affecting civil rights communities are peculiarly susceptible to ameliora-
tion through these alternative approaches. One might focus, for exam-
ple, on twin scourges currently affecting some African-American
communities: children bearing children and especially, murderous
violence.
Major contributors to poverty in African-American communities to-
day are the continuing and accelerating phenomena of teenage pregnancy
and childbirth outside marriage. 56 In same-race "ghettos" (mostly Afri-
can-American), "single parent families account for sixty-five percent of
all families with children,"' 57 and from among all families, single-parent
families are six times more likely to live in low-income ghettos. 58 Civil
rights communities should be most interested in the fact that almost half
of white children, if current rates continue, will live part of their life in a
single-mother home, while eighty-six percent of African-American chil-
15 1. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-50, at 1-20 (1987) (describing monetary grant that enabled legislative attack
on segregated schools).
152. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM; THE MONTGOMERY
STORY (Harper 1958).
153. Id. (describing support network in African-American community).
154. COOK, supra note 113, at 1021, 1043.
155. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1986) (boycott in Missis-
sippi and its practical ramifications in the community); William Booth, Miami Agreement
Ends a Costly Black Boycott, WASH. POST, May 13, 1993, at A3.
156. See William Julius Wilson, Public Policy Research and the Truly Disadvantaged, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 461 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., Brookings Inst.
1991) (underclass characterized often by joblessness among "poor single-parent families").
157. Paul A. Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970-80,
in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 247 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., Brookings
Inst. 1991).
158. Sara McLanahan et al., The Role of Mother-Only Families in Reproducing Poverty,
in CHILDREN IN POVERTY 64 (Aletha C. Huston ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
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dren will live with their single mothers' 59 -and probably in poverty. 160
The phenomenon of single-mother familyhood not only correlates very
highly with poverty,1 6 1 it reproduces poverty at an alarming rate. 162 One
need not disparage the effort that single mothers are making to conclude
that it takes a superhuman effort for them to succeed alone as parents.' 63
To the extent that the problem is greater in civil rights communities, or
has different causes or cures, it is a civil rights problem.'
Because of the recognition of a right to privacy in procreational
matters, 65 the government has a much lesser role to play here, and other
consensual social institutions, such as the church or even extended fam-
ily, have a correspondingly greater sphere of influence. They may also be
the more appropriate social organs because of their nurturing influence:
one study of teenage pregnancy among African-American girls showed
that parental control and supervision, more than poverty itself, corre-
lated with significantly lower rates of pregnancy. 166 Why does the civil
rights community not revive an earlier model of social activism that em-
phasized social work 167 rather than litigation or governmental supervi-
159. IRWIN GARFINKEL & SARA MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHIL-
DREN 2 (Urban Inst. Press 1986).
160. The poverty rate for African-American single mothers is almost 30% higher than
for white single mothers. Sanford L. Dornbusch et al., Single Parents, Extended Households.
and the Control of Adolescents, 56 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 326 (1985) (70% versus 54%).
Comparative data suggest that living in a mother-only household correlates with a 5% de-
crease in the chances of a white child completing high school, but a 13% decrease for African-
American children, GARFINKEL & MCLANAHAN, supra note 159, at 28-29. Failure to finish
high school is a "major predictor" of future poverty and reliance on public assistance. McLan-
ahan, Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty, 90 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 873, 875
(1985).
161. Approximately half of all single-mother families live in poverty. GARFINKEL & MC-
LANAHAN, supra note 159, at 1.
162. Daughters growing up in single-mother families are more than twice as likely as
their peers in nuclear families to raise single-mother families themselves. Sara McLanahan,
Family Structure and Dependency: Early Transitions to Female Household Headship, DEMOG-
RAPHY, Feb. 1988, at 1, 9.
163. For possible theories about what it is in single-mothering that causes the problems
described, see id. at 2-3.
164. See McLanahan, Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty, supra note 160,
at 888 (economic status correlates with drop-out rate for young whites, but not for young
blacks). The same study shows that welfare tends to have negative consequences for whites
wishing to escape poverty permanently, but it may have a positive influence on the long-term
attainment of blacks. Id. at 897.
165. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
166. Dennis P. Hogan & Evelyn M. Kitigawa, The Impact of Social Status, Family Struc-
ture, and Neighborhood on the Fertility of Black Adolescents, 90 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 825,
846-47 (1985) (adolescents in families with lax parental control of dating showed pregnancy
rates 64% higher than those in families with strict controls).
167. See WALTER I. TRATrNER, POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE ch. 8 (The Free Press
1974) (discussing settlement house movement at turn of the century).
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sion as the method for social change? 6 '
The point I have made about problems of single-motherhood in the
black community may also be applied to a range of similar situations
where social mores and community pressure may be even more effective
forms of help-self-help-than civil rights statutes could be. The prob-
lem of drug-related killings in some African-American communities169
has begun to draw serious attention from civil rights leaders. Whoever
may ultimately be at fault for introducing drugs and guns into these com-
munities, it is nevertheless visibly true that when African-Americans are
killing African-Americans, a cure is within the hands of African-Ameri-
cans. The old model of relying almost exclusively on government to in-
carcerate offenders, relieve poverty, or catch non-African-American drug
lords, omits a wide range of additional, perhaps more effective, remedies
that are within the community's, rather than the government's,
control. 70
168. I realize that for the older reader this is not a rhetorical question. Indeed, there may
be many psychological and social reasons to explain the reluctance of civil rights groups to
focus their resources in this direction. "Social uplift" does not carry such a clarion ring in
these days when we are more disposed to believe that black communities are "just fine, thank
you, the way we are." Older black civil rights organizations, already marginalized among
youngsters, might fear even greater rejection should they take on a message that discourages
sex and child-bearing.
I am reminded of a personal experience from Romania, which I visited in 1991 in order to
promote the development of non-governmental civil rights organizations. I met the leader of
the Ethnic Rominy Foundation, an organization of Gypsies, who suffer widespread discrimi-
nation in Romania and elsewhere, and I asked his group's agenda. First on his list, he said, we
want to educate Gypsies to stop stealing and doing other inappropriate things. Personal Jour-
nal for International Human Rights Law Group, Thursday, October 31, 1991 (on file with the
author). My first reaction was that he had himself bought in to the stereotype of Gypsies.
Perhaps I should have thought, is he on to something here?
169. More African-American males have been killed by other African-American males in
the last decade than were lynched by whites since the end of the Civil War. See Marian
Wright Edelman, National Press Club Luncheon Speaker; Marian Wright Edelman, President,
Children's Defense Fund, FEDERAL NEWS SERV., Apr. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
library (speaker was discussing increase in deaths of African-Americans by firearms).
170. Hamil R. Harris & Evelyn Hsu, Fear of Stalker Became Force for Neighborhood
Unity, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1993, at J1.
A rare example of self-help in the contemporary civil rights movement has been the re-
markable efforts undertaken in male homosexual communities to control the spread of AIDS
through unprotected sex. Victor F. Zonana, Data Shows Relapse into Unsafe Sexual Activity
by Gay Men; AIDS: Levels are Far Lower than in Early 1980. But Failure to Maintain Preven-
tions Worries Officials at Conference, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at A3. A similar effort has
been made to provide gray-market medicines to those infected with the HIV virus. See Paula
Span, Buyers' Clubs: Fast Answer to FDA's Slow Approval, HEALTH LINE, Apr. 8, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File; Mireya Navarro, Into the Unknown: AIDS Patients
Test Drugs, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 29, 1992, § 1, at 1; Patients Going Underground to Buy Experi-
mental Drugs, AIDS L. & LrrIG. REP. MONTHLY REV. (Univ. Pub. Group), Dec. 1991, 81.
Some care is necessary in thinking through what non-governmental initiatives may be appro-
priate: what some call "self-empowerment" may have caused more rapid death in others.
[V/ol. 2:177
WHEN CIVIL RIGHTS GO WRONG
Thinking creatively of alternatives to the traditional government-ini-
tiative models would have another benefit. The looming lack of govern-
ment resources would not inhibit action under these models as it does
under government-responsibility models. Just as our evidence shows
that the most successful schools are not those that have the most money,
but those that have the most community involvement, 171 models based
on private initiative would allow the substitution of abundant re-
sources-community members and their energy-for scarce resources-
money and other government aid.
INHIBITORS TO CHANGE AND REFORM: OBFUSCATION IN THE USE
OF "DISCRIMINATION." Using its narrow-based historical formula for
success, the civil rights movement has for almost forty years pushed
ahead by seemingly purposeful obfuscation in its use of the word "dis-
crimination." This occurred as early as in the drafting of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, when Congress chose not to specify concretely
whether it aimed its remedies at only intentional discrimination or also at
the disparate, unintended effects flowing from the enforcement of neutral
standards. 72 This practice continued in later years, as Congress side-
stepped the issue with a contrived "results test" in the 1982 Voting
Rights Act.17 3 It continued the practice in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
by failing to describe unambiguously the circumstances under which so-
Richard Grant, Staying Alive with the Aids Guerrillas, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 2,
1992, at 4.
171. Douglas P. Munro, How to Find Out Where the Money Goes in the Public Schools,
955 THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION STATE BACKGROUNDER 1 (1993). See also Ron Stodghill
II, A Tale of Two School Districts, Bus. WK., Aug. 2, 1993, at 63-65; Mary Jordan, Group
Challenges Increase in Public School Spending, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1993, at A4. Cf. Ste-
phanie Anderson Forest, True or False: More Money Buys Better Schools, Bus. WK., Aug. 2,
1993, at 62-63 (discussing question of whether school financing is more crucial than other
factors to the improvement of academic performance).
172. See Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: Toward a Regulatory
Model for Defining Discrimination, 70 GEO. L.J. 1 (1981); cf Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (Congress permitted regulatory adop-
tion of regulations prohibiting "effects-style" discrimination).
173. The "results" test of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)
(1972), was a political safe haven half-way between the intent-only position of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and the full "effects" test that was applied under § 5 of the original
Act to jurisdictions having a history of intentional discrimination, see Georgia v. United
States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). S. Rep. No.
97-417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28 [PL 97-205] (1982), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982,
pp. 177, 205 [96 Stat 131]. In Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (involving use of
single-member districts to dilute minority voting power), Justice Brennan blurred the effects
and results tests, [citing above S. Rep.], but ultimately recognized that single-member districts
are not per se illegal under § 2 and that a "totality of the circumstances" test applies. Id. at 45.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, id. at 83, probably more closely captures the view of
the present Court, see Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (per O'Connor, J., for a
unanimous Court) (minority "packing" of voters also subject to § 2 analysis), and in both
Gingles and Voinovich she uses a test, though labeled "effects," that has no tendency to outlaw
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called "subjective hiring" would be deemed unlawful.' 74
As with Congress, it has sometimes been beneficial for leaders of
civil rights communities to lump together the social impact of intention-
ally discriminatory action and unintentional conduct. This is not sur-
prising because, given the consensus against intentional discrimination
that refuses to treat all as mutual equals, 175 the more persuasive social
argument is always one that makes it appear that intentional discrimina-
tion is the single cause of a minority's social plight. But this obfuscation
denies civil rights advocates the ability to see for themselves and to edu-
cate others about the quite different remedies that may be necessary for
different versions of "discrimination."
Two examples adequately illustrate my point. First, if lower aver-
age wages for women are only the product of intentional discrimination,
an aggressively pursued war on intentional sex discrimination, coupled
with a very narrow BFOQ defense, 176 could be an adequate remedy. But
if the wage differential is due to other neutral social barriers that separate
women from high-paying jobs, a different set of measures is necessary
and it will be necessary to acknowledge that men and women may be
situated differently. 177 If the differences resulted from non-coercive pri-
vate choices, the differential might even go unremedied.17' A second ex-
ample is "discrimination" in bank lending. 179 To the extent that what is
at issue is intentional discrimination that does not treat African-Ameri-
cans as whites would be treated,'8 0 the cure would involve no costs, and
all practices having any adverse effect on African-American voting power. See Voinovich, 113
S. Ct. at 1156.
174. See supra note 108.
175. See supra note 143.
176. See International Union, UAAAIW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)
("protection" of pregnant women from dangers to fetuses is intentional sex discrimination
unsaved by a bona fide occupational qualification analysis [BFOQ] defense).
177. Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1728 (1986) (article on causes of unequal wages). A similar phenomenon may
be at work in what might be called the return of the "potty issue": if women require more
bathroom facilities to meet women's need, is it "discrimination" to provide only "equal" facili-
ties? Cf. Paul Weingarten, Men's Room Trip Opens Door to Women's Rights, CHICAGO TRIB-
UNE, July 29, 1990, at 5 (long lines necessitate woman's recourse to men's room). Since each
individual has human dignity in these matters, each need should be met, regardless of whether
failure had been previously occasioned by men's intent to harm women.
178. Those who speak of hegemony would probably disagree, seeing coercion in the sys-
tem and a false consciousness as factors in private choice. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Pragma-
tism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763 (1990). But if
each person has two consciousnesses, W. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 17 (1961)
("American" and "Negro" or ethnic identification), and probably multiple consciousnesses
depending on how each self-identifies, no consciousness is false other than the one denied.
179. See George C. Galster, Research on Discrimination in Housing Mortgage Markets:
Assessment and Future Directions, 3 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 641 (1992).
180. See Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data,
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might even add to the cost-efficiency of financing mechanisms. But if the
differences are based on credit-worthiness, an end to the "discrimina-
tion" would require a subsidy of African-American debtors. 1 81
Whether from obfuscation or sloppy thinking, the failure to identify
cause and effect in discrimination can have undesired consequences.
First, it limits the civil rights advocate's range of remedial choices. Rhet-
oric in this sense is a false consciousness that can prevent us from seeing
the world as it actually is, with dangerous results: different maladies have
different cures. Second, the rhetoric is becoming increasingly unpersua-
sive to a new generation that feels less personally guilty of the sins of the
past and perceives itself as consistently (if not absolutely) free of inten-
tional bias.' 82 The diversifying of American life through the expansion
of new immigrant groups, or newly liberated groups, also means that
more people will see themselves as faultless for unintended harms affect-
ing traditional civil rights groups. Rhetoric will not persuade these
groups.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have suggested that there are some shortcomings in the current
civil rights movement that your generation should want to repair. Preju-
dice, intolerance and dissembling degrade the human dignity of perpetra-
tor and victim alike, and having civil rights communities participate in
the degradation of others is something that we can well do without. We
have, I have argued, lost sight of Dr. King's most enduring message, that
there is no legitimacy to the agenda of equality and dignity without obe-
dience to the process of equality and dignity.
I have also suggested that now is a good time to move on to a newly
reinvigorated civil rights movement that will not be the captive of a pre-
vious generation's methods and models. There is an essential message
here of continuity in the change, however. As a new generation begins to
explore new solutions for newly perceived problems, such as poverty
92-7 Working Paper Series 1 (Federal Res. Bank of Boston, 1992); Allen J. Fishbein, The
Ongoing Experiment with "Regulation from Below" Expanded Reporting Requirements for
HMDA and CRA, 3 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 601, 618-19 (1992) (even controlled for factors
signifying credit-worthiness, blacks denied loans at significantly higher rate than whites).
181. See Penny Lunt, How Seven Banks Serve Low Income Markets, Am. Bankers A.
Banking J., Sept. 1992, at 58 (counselling and special loan solicitation by specially hired teams
of roving loan officers); Phil Hall, Mission Difficult, Not Impossible, Am. Bankers A. Banking
J., Aug. 1990, at 71, 73 (commercial bank makes such loans and accepts lower profit rate).
Even if the current results were caused by accumulation of intentional discrimination else-
where, one might rationally decide to choose some other mechanism than banks' subsidization
of loans in order to allocate costs more equitably ("internalize" them), or to preserve the
soundness of the banking system.
182. Edward Kenney, Race Affects Teen's Outlook on Prejudice, USA TODAY, Jan. 14,
1993 at ID (citing survey done by Who's Who Among American High School Students).
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among children, violence in African-American communities, disease in
the gay community, we should be true to Dr. King's underlying values
for the civil rights movement: it is a movement not about black and
white, women and men, homosexuals and heterosexuals, the abidingly
healthy and the disabled, but a movement about human dignity for all
people.
